Prisoners’ votes: another dodgy ruling from the European Court

January 18 2011

The European Court of Human Rights has ruled today that an Italian prisoner’s rights were breached where he was sentenced to prison for life, and as a result lost the right to vote indefinitely. The ECtHR’s ruling in Scoppola v Italy (the judgment is only available in French for the moment, I’m afraid) will cause concern among ministers in London – and for good reason. The ruling is legally questionable. But if the judges in Strasbourg do maintain this line in future, their new “four year cut-off” policy may be indefensible in the courts, and they could have to make more concessions.

I last wrote about this issue before Christmas, when the government announced its proposed “four year rule”: prisoners serving less than four years will be entitled to vote, while those serving four years or more will not. That stance was clearly a calculated risk by ministers: following the key ruling in Hirst v UK in 2005, the judgment in Frodl v Austria went far further, strongly suggested the UK would have to give almost all prisoners the vote, and that any disenfranchisement could only relate to a very narrow category of prisoners and be imposed by the sentencing judge in an individual case. On that approach, no “bright line” policy based on four years, ten years or even life imprisonment would be permitted. So the government must have been mightily relieved when in its “pilot judgment” in Greens & MT v UK, the court appeared to step back from Frodl (paras. 113-114):

it was recently held in Frodl … that … any decision on disenfranchisement should be taken by a judge and there must be a link between the offence committed and issues relating to elections and democratic institutions… However… As the Court emphasised in Hirst, there are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems… The Court recalls that its role in this area is a subsidiary one: the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions and, as a result … the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight ……

the Court considers that a wide range of policy alternatives are available to the Government in the present context…. Emphasising the wide margin of appreciation in this area (see Hirst, § 61), the Court is of the view that it is for the Government, following appropriate consultation, to decide in the first instance how to achieve compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 when introducing legislative proposals.

That judgment re-opened the door to the kind of “bright lines” approach the government then decided to take, based on a four-year cut-off.

Scoppola, though, appears to take the Court’s thinking straight back to Frodl. In this case, Italian law deprives prisoners of the vote automatically if they are sentenced to three years imprisonment or more – a system closely resembling the UK government’s current policy. The Strasbourg judges have concluded that breaches the right to free elections not because three years is too low, but, just as in Frodl, because any such generalised cut-off is impermissible (para. 43; the translation is mine):

The Court finally recalls that in its recent case law in applying the criteria established in the case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), it is essential that the decision on disenfranchisement be taken by a judge and be appropriately reasoned.

There’s no cause for immediate panic in Whitehall. As a matter of international law, the UK is entitled to stand on Hirst and Greens, and see if its new policy survives any challenge in the courts. But there is clearly a shocking inconsistency in the approaches of the judges in Strasbourg, the decision arrived at here unanimously being based on a clearly different, more formalistic and intrusive approach from that also taken unanimously in the more politically sensible Greens judgment.

No wonder senior MPs are concerned about this. Jack Straw and David Davis are being unrealistic if they think Hirst and Greens can be ignored or overruled, even by Parliament. But judges can take unreasonable stands too, and in Frodl and now Scoppola, some Strasbourg judges have gone far too far in laying down in precise detail what national policies must be.

2011-01-18T18:03:30+00:00Tags: , , , |

Employment Tribunal ruling: O’Reilly v BBC

January 11 2011

Here’s the Employment Tribunal’s ruling in Miriam O’Reilly’s successful age discrimination and victimisation claim aginst the BBC over its decision to drop her as a presenter of Countryfile. She won on age discrimination, on the basis that the ET thought she would have been considered seriously as a presenter when the programme moved to an evening slot, had she been 15 years younger. She lost on sex discrimination, because the ET didn’t think an older man would have been treated better. The victimisation relates to decisions to drop O’Reilly from Radio 4 programmes, and to drop an artcle from her in the Countryfile magazine.

O’Reilly v BBC

This case seems to me to involve a clash of cultures, between the “slot-filling” approach it often seems is followed in the media, according to which a man or woman for instance might be chosen so as to create the appearance of diversity and fairness on the screen, perhaps in the genuine belief that that’s what fairness consists of – as against the culture of real equal opportunity which the tribunal pointedly makes clear is actually required from organisations.

It’s encouraging that the BBC seems to have reacted positively to the ruling. I hope it brings in changes to remove age discrimination in its practices. But doing so would be a really radical step – the issue is not just about getting it wrong in this case, but about the whole acceptability of judging presenters as “looking wrong” for a programme – and could change the face of its programming markedly. I wonder if it really will.

(Hat-tip: UK Human Rights Blog).

2011-01-11T18:44:21+00:00Tags: , , |

Assange “objected to segregation”, says lawyer

December 22 2010

So Mark Stephens has told me in a tweet within the last half hour. Here’s his response

yes. They had a long discussion about it.

to my follow-up inquiry

One more point, Mark: did JA object to the governor’s segregation decision?

Earlier today I told you Mark Stephens had denied Assange himself asked to be segregated. This takes things a little further: it seems he actually objected to segregation.

2010-12-22T23:28:52+00:00Tags: , , |

LibCon: is the process fair to Julian Assange?

December 22 2010

Sunny Hundal has published an important piece at Liberal Conspiracy today – one that Benjamin Gray has contributed to, as have I, a bit – arising from Ben Goldacre’s frustration that the mainstream media didn’t seem to be fact-checking the claims and implications of unfairness being made by or on behalf of Julian Assange over the last couple of weeks.

I share the frustration that the media hasn’t seemed to be examining the claims that have been made. Last week I felt I was beginning to understand how a story can begin to take a particular shape because most of what we’re told about it comes from one, interested source. I’m not of course accusing Julian Assange or any of his lawyers of misleading us. But he’s naturally defending himself, and they are doing their job of courtroom and public advocacy for him. What they say is obviously one side of the story. It should not merely be accepted uncritically by journalists or bloggers, any more than what’s said by any official source.

I agree with Ben Goldacre too that this is the digging people can sensibly do. It’s not only pointless for anyone to try to get to the bottom of the Swedish criminal suspicions against him – it’s wrong. He’s entitled to the presumption of innocence and a fair trial by a proper court if the matter gets that far; he shouldn’t have to face an ignorant mob-trial by television, blogpost or tweet. I also think it’s wrong for anyone who’s not seen the evidence simply to dismiss or disparage allegations of rape and sexual assault. The women who’ve apparently made accusations in this case are entitled to have what they’ve said properly investigated and evaluated by the Swedish authorities, and to privacy beyond that.

2010-12-22T16:39:29+00:00Tags: , , |

Assange’s lawyer denies he requested segregation

December 22 2010

Julian Assange’s lawyer Mark Stephens made the denial in a tweet to me this morning:

he didn’t Carl. Have confirmed to anyone who asked. It was the Governors decision, sd to be for safety.

For a few days now I’ve been trying to get to the bottom of how Assange came to be held “in solitary confinement” (as Mark Stephens has put it – see this impromptu press conference outside City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 14 December, 8 minutes in) when in Wandsworth prison from the 6-16 December.

Two media sources had previously published anonymous suggestions that Julian Assange might himself have asked to be segregated from other prisoners under “rule 45” of the Prison Rules. On 9 December the Guardian wrote that

Assange is thought to have asked to be housed away from other prisoners, who had shown a high degree of interest in him after he arrived

and on 15 December the Daily Mail wrote that

A prison source said Assange was being treated like any other inmate held in the segregation unit, which is where he had requested to be.
What Mark Stephens has said today clearly contradicts the anonymous sources referred to in the Guardian and Mail, and would seem to close the question of how segregation came about. It makes sense that the decision was on grounds of safety: under Prison Service Order 1700 Julian Assange’s own protection would be the only relevant grounds on which he could be segregated from other prisoners. There’s no suggestion Assange could have been thought disruptive or to have committed any misconduct in prison, which would be the alternatives.
2010-12-22T16:45:18+00:00Tags: , , |

Taking Vince Cable off the BSkyB case

December 21 2010

Vince Cable has not resigned over his reported remark that he’d “declared war on Rupert Murdoch” – but the Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt will make any further decision on the proposed News Corporation takeover of BSkyB instead of him. There are a number of legal points to be made about this.

First, there’s no constitutional problem about transferring the decision to Jeremy Hunt. As the recently published draft Cabinet manual says (para. 100), powers legally vested in “the Secretary of State” can be exercised by any Secretary of State. That’s partly because the Secretary of State is a single office in law, which a number of people happen to be appointed to at any time, and partly because of the definition of “Secretary of State” in the Interpretation Act 1978.

But did Cable have to be taken off the case? I don’t think so, legally. Obviously for Cable to have been recorded making these remarks is embarrassing, and it would have meant News Corp. could have argued Cable’s decision was unlawful because of bias, if he had gone on to block its bid. It’s difficult to imagine there wouldn’t have been a judicial review claim based on what he said. But there might have been a judicial review anyway; and even with these remarks I think a decision by Vince Cable could successfully have been defended.

The legal question, according to the leading House of Lords case of Magill v Weeks (often referred to as Porter v Magill) is (see Lord Hope’s speech at paras. 99-103)

whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the [decision maker] was biased.

At first blush you might think it obvious there’s bias applying these words. I’m not so sure. First, in that case the House of Lords in fact found no bias even though before the district auditor had made a final decision on Dame Shirley Porter (see Lord Hope’s speech, para. 96)

A televised announcement was arranged at which the auditor himself appeared and, although he said that his views were provisional, he expressed them in florid language and supported them by reference to the thoroughness of the investigation which he claimed to have carried out.

Second, I agree with James Maurici‘s critical comment on the case in this excellent 2007 paper for the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association in which he argues that Porter v Magill has confused what was previously a clear distinction in case law between predetermination cases like Vince Cable’s, in which the alleged bias arise from views expressed in advance, and other types of bias, and suggests the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of course) needs to revisit the issue. He summarises his view of the law as follows (page 8):

Non-judicial decision-makers are entitled to have predispositions – they are entitled to express them – and in strong terms. So long as they don’t come to a decision with an entirely closed mind there is no objection to this.

I agree, and I think Vince Cable fell squarely within this.

I also agree with Karen Steyn‘s admirably clear analysis in her more recent paper discussing the law of bias and predetermination as it applies to councillors. She, like James Maurici, stresses the pragmatic approach taken by the courts to predetermination cases since 2005, and says (para. 19)

Elected members are entitled to have, and to have expressed, views on controversial local matters. They are entitled to be pre-disposed to certain views: the requirement is to have an open mind – not an empty one.

In her view the key is whether the decision-maker has closed his mind during the decision-making process itself, and she sees this as a hard test to satisfy. She concludes (para. 33)

A decision will only be vitiated if one or more members refused – or there is positive evidence establishing a real possibility that they refused – to even to consider a relevant new argument.

I’m far from sure Vince Cable’s remarks, which can be understood as a joking reference to horrified reactions to his intervention, meet that test. I think a subsequent decision made by him could be successfully defended in law, and that taking him off the case reflects political embarrassment more than it does legal necessity.

By the way, I don’t think a higher standard applies to Vince Cable because his decision is “quasi-judicial”. Many public lawyers think it’s unhelpful to talk as though there is such a separate broad category of decision short of truly judicial ones, and I agree. The real question is what fairness requires in the context of a particular decision-making process.

But anyway, if there is a such a thing as a quasi-judicial decision, this ain’t it. It doesn’t involve determining a dispute between competing claims, or making findings of fact, or deciding whether to impose sanctions on anyone. It’s more like a classic policy judgment about what the public interest requires in the context of media ownership, of the sort we elect politicians to take precisely because they have views.

We will live in a less democratic world if judges or (more likely) politicians and the media decide it’s “inappropriate” for people with opinions to take decisions in policy fields they’re interested in. That approach is anti-political; it would prevent any idealist from improving the world. I’m sad to hear Ed Miliband say Cable breached the Ministerial Code; I don’t think he did.

Finally, let’s get clear about what decision we’re dealing with. Cable issued a European intervention notice, which initiated procedures under the Enterprise Act 2001 (Protection of Legitimate Interests) Order 2003. So the next decision required, now from Jeremy Hunt, is whether to refer News Corporation’s proposed takeover of BSkyB to the Competition Commission, under article 5 of the 2003 Order, following OFCOM’s report on the public interest; and if he does that, whether following the Competition Commission’s report, whether to take enforcement action under article 12. That can include blocking the takeover completely.

The legislation is complex, but for the few who want more chapter and verse,  the European intervention notice was issued under section 67 of the Enterprise Act 2002; Vince Cable was entitled to do this to protect a legitimate public interest under article 21.4 of the EU Merger Regulation – the public interest consideration being the need for there to be a “sufficient plurality” of persons with control of media enterprises in accordance with section 58(2C)(a) of the Enterprise Act.

Section 11 of this guidance explains further.

The pure competition aspects of the deal have already been dealt with by the European Commission – which has cleared it.

Prisoners’ votes: the government triangulates

December 17 2010

Today has seen the failure in the Court of Appeal of the judicial review in Chester v Justice Secretary, a case that always was hopeless.

More importantly, the government intends to give the vote to all prisoners serving less than four year sentences; and to give trial judges the power to ban even these from voting in appropriate individual cases.

Obviously this will finally discharge the government’s clear obligation to change the law to comply with the judgment in Hirst v UK, in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled that our current law, which disenfranchises all convicted prisoners, breaches Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. That obligation became all the more pressing following the Court’s very recent “pilot judgment” in Greens & MT v UK ordering the UK to bring forward legislation to comply with Hirst within six months. Britain will be out of the dock, and not at risk of the embarassment of being the first state to face new “infraction proceedings” in Strasbourg.

The difficulty the government faced was how far to go. On the one hand, some people urged a “minimalist” approach to implementing Hirst, allowing a small number of less serious offenders to vote so as merely to remove the “blanket” ban on prisoners voting which was the heart of the trouble. On the other hand, the post-Hirst case of Frodl v Austria seemed clearly to threaten that any solution would be unsatisfactory unless it gave the vote to the great majority of prisoners, with only a judge able to take it away in rare individual cases involving, for example, election fraud. That was a judgment I criticised severely in an earlier post.

But the ECtHR seems to have realised it might have gone too far. At least, in Greens (see paras. 112-114) it seemed to step back a bit from Frodl and make clear the government had a range of policy options, while of course pointing out that it’s likely to have to scrutinise whatever is chosen in due course.

The government’s taken advantage of that apparent softening of approach by in effect triangulating: its chosen policy is a significant rather than minimal change from the status quo but falls a long way short of where Frodl seemed to point. Presumably ministers and their lawyers think their new four-year cut-off is the sort of “bright line” policy (setting a clear principle in law, rather than a complex system of exceptions or case-by-case discretion) that stands a reasonable chance of withstanding the challenge that is bound to come once more in the domestic courts and in Strasbourg.

A couple of last words, since I mention the domestic courts. First, while in Chester today Laws LJ and his Court of Appeal colleagues have undoubtedly reached the right decision – not difficult, that, in this easy case – I really wish they’d fully reasoned through how section 3 of the Human Rights Act works and why it can’t be used to “reinterpret” section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 so as to give prisoners the vote or to read in a role for judges. The principles laid down  in the leading case, Ghaidan, are quite clear but widely misunderstood, and unless judges apply them expressly I fear interpretation under the Human Rights Act will remain mysterious even to lawyers.

Second, it’s worth mentioning the issue of prisoners’ votes is not one in which domestic judges under the Human Rights Act have undermined government policy. On the contrary, while properly applying the case-law of the European Court, according to which our legislation had to be declared incompatible with the ECHR, they left the problem entirely to Parliament to solve, refusing attempts to reinterpret the legislation (as In Chester today) or intefere with elections. Whatever you think of all this, it ain’t the fault of the Human Rights Act.

2010-12-17T19:30:00+00:00Tags: , , , |

Julian Assange: no further appeal, and complying with bail conditions

December 16 2010

As I write, Julian Assange may still be in custody, while the necessary processing work is done by the people who’ve stood surety for him, according to media reports. You’ll see that under section 8(4) and (5) of the Bail Act 1976, the sureties will have to be considered acceptable by the police, if they’re turning up at police stations to “enter their recognizance” as the legislation puts it.

Nor have I seen a definitive, detailed report of exactly what the bail conditions are, although it appears they’re similar to those laid down by the district judge on Tuesday – residence at a known address in Suffolk, one or more periods of curfew, electronic monitoring, daily reporting to a police station (in the afternoons, when it’s open), £200,000 security and sureties of at least £40,000. It’s pretty much the full panoply of conditions the judge could have imposed.

But while we’re waiting for him to be released, I thought I should deal with a couple of questions that may be occurring to people now.

First, there’s no provision for any further appeal against bail from the prosecution. So once Julian Assange is released – I still presume tonight – he will be free until the next extradition hearing on the 11th of January.

As long as he complies with the bail conditions, that is. If he breached any of them, he could be arrested under section 7 and brought again before a district judge, who’d decide whether he was in breach, and if so whether to remand him in custody.

He could also be arrested of course if he failed to turn up at his next extradition hearing on 11th January (section 7(1)) – and that would be an offence under section 6(1).

2010-12-16T18:56:04+00:00Tags: , , |

How electronic tagging works

December 16 2010

One of the bail conditions Julian Assange will be subject to it electronic monitoring – to make sure he’s actually at the Suffolk premises he’s supposed to be at during the periods of his curfew. If you want to know how it works, here’s a guide prepared for judges by the security firm Serco – who will I think be responsible for monitoring Julian Assange since they have the contract for the East of England.

Presumably Serco will visit the premises tonight to carry out the “induction” process – fitting the necessary equipment at the house, in other words.

Electronic Monitoring a Guide for the Judiciary

2010-12-16T18:13:52+00:00Tags: , |
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