The “Twitter joke” trial: why on earth did the DPP pursue this case?

Today’s judgment in the “Twitter joke” trial appeal is an important victory for Paul Chambers, who can now move forward with his life as a man of good character. The legal system has wronged him; but now at least that wrong has been put to an end, and corrected to some extent. It’s a victory too for his legal team and for his supporters, who are entitled to feel they’ve played a role in a significant blow for free expression, and against the sort of silly thinking that throws common sense out of the window where the internet is concerned.

The judgment leaves a couple of important questions unanswered, though.

First, while Paul Chambers’s lawyers (who’ve had a couple of days to study the judgment) feel it gives an important measure of clarity to tweeters – I’m less sure. The key to the court’s reasoning is at paragraph 30 of the judgment, where it concludes that a message which creates no fear is not caught by section 127 of the Communications Act 2003:

a message which cannot or is unlikely to be implemented may nevertheless create a sense of apprehension or fear in the person who receives or reads it. However unless it does so, it is difficult to see how it can sensibly be described as a message of a menacing character …

In short, a message which does not create fear or apprehension in those to whom it is communicated, or who may reasonably expected [sic] to see it, falls outside this provision, for the very simple reason that the message lacks menace.

There are two problems with this. First, it’s far from clear why the court has referred to those “who may reasonably be expected” to read a message like this. If the key is whether fear is actually produced, it follows that only those who do read it can have fear produced in them. The reference to people who may reasonably be expected to read a tweet causes confusion between the idea that what matters is how people react to an allegedly menacing message, and that idea that what matters is what the sender of the message ought to have thought might happen.

Much more importantly, though, if the key here was that Paul Chambers’s tweet put no one in fear – there was no evidence that it did so, something the court noted at paragraph 13 of the judgment – we must infer that the result might well have been different had there been evidence that anyone had felt apprehension, as the court put it, on reading the tweet. Nowhere in the judgment does the court provide any legal reasoning which suggests the outcome would have been the same had there been any such evidence. It’s true that, in paragraphs 31 to 33, the court considers the tweet in its context and appears to see the reaction of those who read it as only part of the picture. But it’s clear, ultimately, that the court decided Paul Chamber’s tweet was not menacing because there was no evidence that anyone felt fear; and that the Crown Court’s decision was set aside because it failed to give sufficient weight to this.

So I’m not sure this judgment produces clarity or safety for those who tweet jokes like the one Paul Chambers made. Yes, the courts will consider the full context or your tweet. And no doubt the CPS will be very wary of taking a prosecution like this again. But you cannot know before you tweet a joke whether it might – just might – make someone feel apprehensive. If you think it just conceivably might, and in the event someone says that it does, then you may well commit an offence under section 127. I would not relish having to argue that I was not guilty because the person who claimed to be apprehensive was being unreasonable.

The other key question, and one which both Paul Chambers’s solicitor David Allen Green and Louise Mensch MP raised in their interviews with me this morning, is why this case was pursued by the CPS – at least once the matter went to appeal. Green said the DPP’s decision to continue to fight the case was “disgraceful”; Ms Mensch said the CPS owes Paul Chambers an apology, and Parliament an explanation.

I’m not sure I agree with Louise Mensch about the DPP needing to explain himself to Parliament. I don’t doubt MPs have a legitimate interest in what happened in this case, and I don’t say they’d be wrong to summon Keir Starmer to explain his decisions. At the same time, though, the DPP and the Crown Prosecution Service must be, and must be seen to be, independent not only of government but of Parliament. The rule of law requires that independent prosecutors take independent decisions, without fear of or pressure from MPs. So while I agree with Louise Mensch’s criticism of the CPS, and while Keir Starmer should if need be account to those MPs who want to tell him he got this case wrong, he’s also entitled to tell them that he makes his own mistakes – not those politicians tell him to make.

The more important role for Parliament, if it wants to protect tweeters from CPS heavy-handedness, is to change the law so as to make a prosecution like this impossible in future, even in the sort of circumstances I considered earlier.

I do though agree that the CPS and the DPP made a shockingly bad decision in prosecuting this case, and certainly in continuing to fight it once the initial conviction was appealed. It’s not easy to see how this prosecution was in the public interest.

Crucial, though, is the “dog that didn’t bark”, or perhaps that barked at one stage but never bit. The initial case stated appeal back in February (there had to be a second appeal because the two judges who heard the first one couldn’t agree) was argued mainly on the basis of human rights. This time round, no doubt for strategic reasons, Paul Chambers’s lawyers chose not to focus on freedom of expression but on the plain English criminal law point about whether the tweet was menacing – the point which has ultimately won.

Nonetheless the article 10 Convention right to free expression is absolutely at the heart of this case, and in determining it on other legal grounds, the courts have evaded that important legal point. The CPS was bound to take article 10 into account in reaching its decision to prosecute, and can only lawfully have prosecuted if doing so was a proportionate interference with freedom of expression.

But a prosecution was obviously disproportionate from the beginning. No one was put in fear by this tweet; and no anxiety was caused at the airport. Even if in law the tweet had technically been “menacing”, the decision to prosecute affected Paul Chambers’s life in a severe way – involving first the threat and then the reality of a criminal record, which I understand lost him two jobs – and in a way which was entirely foreseeable. Of course that sort of thing happens in almost every criminal case. But in most cases, there is enough of a public interest in punishing the allegedly unlawful behaviour that the private interest affect is outweighed. Here, not only was there not such a public interest; it was obvious from the beginning that there was none.

The prosecution of Paul Chambers was unlawful, because it was a disproportionate interference with free speech, incompatible with the article 10 Convention right. How on earth can the DPP can have concluded otherwise?

2012-07-27T17:11:57+00:00

“Twitter joke” appeal: interview with Paul Chambers’s legal team

Following today’s judgment in the “Twitter joke” trial appeal, I spoke to Paul Chambers’s legal team: David Allen Green, Sarah Przybylska and John Cooper QC. I ask about their reactions to the case, and how clear they think the ruling is. It’s worth listening to for David Allen Green’s view on the decision of the DPP personally to pursue the prosecution through the appeal process – which he calls “disgraceful”.

2012-07-27T12:22:11+00:00

Chambers v DPP: the judgment

Here’s the judgment in today’s “Twitter joke” trial appeal. If you read in the viewer below, or click through the the document, you’ll see my comments highlighted at various points in the judgment.

2012-07-27T15:28:07+00:00

The “Twitter joke” appeal: victory for Paul Chambers

Paul Chambers’s appeal was successful this morning in his appeal against conviction for sending a menacing tweet under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, in the case known as the “Twitter joke trial” appeal. I’ll post the judgment as soon as I can. In the meantime, Paul Chambers and his legal team spoke to the media as they emerged from court – you can listen below.

You hear Paul Chambers himself first, then his leading counsel John  Cooper QC and solicitor David Allen Green. Finally there are some words from one of Paul Chambers’s most prominent supporters, the comedian Al Murray.

2012-07-27T11:22:57+00:00

“It’s make or break for the criminal bar”: interview with John Cooper QC

I spoke to John Cooper QC today at his chambers to ask him why he’s standing for Vice-Chair of the Criminal Bar Association, and why in his manifesto he raises the prospect of potential industrial action by barristers in response to government policies on criminal legal aid.

It’s an extended interview in which he talks about referral fees, quality assurance, the dangers of a “one-stop shop” approach to criminal legal aid, late payments and government cuts to criminal legal aid generally – as well as his suggestion that the criminal bar must be prepared to take action.

Online voting is open now for members of the Association; the other candidates are Kerim Fuad QC and Nigel Lithman QC.

Listen to the interview in the player below.

We must say no to this bad Lords reform

Walter Bagehot, in his high Victorian classic The English Constitution, wrote that

the danger of the House of Lords certainly is, that it may never be reformed.

Already the view’s been expressed that if you have a problem with the coalition’s House of Lords Reform Bill then, since the perfect is the enemy of the good, objectively speaking you’re resistant to reform. I don’t hold with that. Further reform is welcome. But those who’d tinker with the constitution need close watching; and bad reform is worse than none.

Bagehot, admittedly writing at a time when the Lords was full of hereditary peers, nonetheless made a number of points about it that I think should still guide us in thinking about our second chamber. He warned us to ensure two authorities are not “up”:

The evil of two co-equal Houses of distinct natures is obvious

and about the dangerous potential of the Lords:

the House of Lords would, on the very surface of the matter, rule us far more than it does if it had not secret defects which hamper and weaken it.

He rightly identified that the key to making it work is getting the right people into it:

It is incredibly difficult to get a revising assembly, because it is difficult to find a class of respected revisers.

And he stressed that what it needs most of all is independence:

It would not be powerful … unless it were known to be independent. The Lords are in several respects more independent than the Commons; their judgment may not be so good a judgment, but it is emphatically their own judgment.

Whatever we think of the House of Lords in the 1860s, anything we create today must meet these tests. It must be clearly subordinate to the Commons, with limited power; it must have credibility and respect as a revising chamber; and it must not be the creature of government or party. These principles are at least as important as whether or not it’s elected.

The most obvious defect in this reform is that it would preserve indefinitely the special place of “Lords spiritual” in the second chamber. The proposal, under Part 4 of the Bill, is that their numbers should gradually be reduced to twelve. Five of them would be ex-officio – the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and so on. The remaining seven would be somehow selected by the Church of England.

This is simply shocking. We can live with this remnant of a bygone age while we wait for the future second chamber to take shape, perhaps step by step. But the most obvious and necessary reform now would be a one-clause bill abolishing the “Lords spiritual”. No reform that keeps them can be accepted, and that fact that this bill does so wounds fatally its “democratic” claims.

But there are more problems, and arguably worse ones, with every category of member this Bill would create: the elected, appointed, ministerial and transitional ones. The problem is where to start.

Under clause 4(6), elected members will serve for three “electoral periods” – basically, three Parliaments amounting to fifteen years, although since not every general election would trigger a partial Lords election (see clause 3(3)(b)), if we had a period of closely-spaced general elections as in the 1960s and 70s, some elected members might end up serving seventeen or more years. Some members might end up serving less than fifteen. Voting, under clause 3(2), will be on general election day and under clause 4(2), 120 members will be elected each time. The idea is that the House should gradually fill with elected members, 120 being added at each of the first three elections and a third of the eventual total of 360 being replaced at each election after that. Clause 26(1)(e) prevents people from standing again once their long term is complete. Members will be elected by a proportional “list” system under Schedule 3 to the Act. There are many things wrong with these arrangements.

Real democracy is not just about being elected in the first place – it’s also about the need for politicians to seek a renewed mandate, or be replaced. To elect members once only, for a long, non-renewable term, is no more than semi-democratic. This sort of elective unaccountability receives at best one cheer.

The timing of elections is also arguably a problem, landing as it does on Commons elections days. This being so, the 120 members elected each time – even under a PR system – are likely always to reflect, in a softer way, the majority gained by an incoming or returning government. Once you realise this, it becomes clear that at any Lords election, it’s unlikely that a long-serving government would lose power significantly, and it could well gain. There’d never be anything like the mid-term loss of power that a President’s administration can suffer in the United States. I’m not sure how this is resolved (although electing some Lords at European and local election terms might help) or that anything like the gridlocked American system is desirable – but it’s far from obvious that what Nick Clegg has chosen is right. This simply illustrates the need for careful thought about major constitutional change

There are concerns too about the independence of these elected members – which depends on who they’ll be, how precisely they get elected and what ambitions they’ll have. The electoral system chosen will need to be closely examined (and I’ll be doing a lot of thinking about it) but at first blush Schedule 3 seems to give too much power to parties as opposed to voters. To be fair, this is an “open list” system: we’ll be able to vote not just for a party, but for an individual candidate. But look at paragraph 3(2):

A vote for a party candidate is treated for the purposes of paragraph 4 as a vote for the candidate’s party.

Taken with paragraph 4(2) (the italics are mine) –

The first seat is to be allocated to the party or the independent candidate with the largest number of votes

the result must be that, by voting for one candidate in party’s list, you cannot avoid helping other candidates from that party being elected above others – even though you may have wanted to help that candidate alone. A Labour vote is not necessarily just a Labour vote: you may not want your vote for Tony Benn to be counted as support for Tony Blair. There seems on first sight of these arrangements to be an almost imperceptible but nonetheless real built-in advantage to party favourites.

Even more important is that candidates for election, even party candidates, should be drawn from a different pool than would-be members of the Commons. One of the greatest strengths of the current House of Lords is that no one can seriously try to launch a political career in it. Retaining that feature is important: if we can, it’d mean even party candidates would be a slightly different breed of politician – less careerist, more committed to being detailed legislators, perhaps more specialist.

But I’m afraid this bill abandons that. It’s vital that no one should be able to try their luck at getting into either the Commons or the Lords at the same election – and the Bill does provide that. Members are disqualified from being MPs while in the Lords, obviously, and under clause 41 for a further “disqualifying period” of 4 years and a month after they stop. But that’s not good enough, especially when you realise that under clause 45, an elected member of the Lords can resign with immediate effect.

The result is that someone (say a favoured party insider who’s top of the list, benefiting from “Tony Benn” type votes to get elected) can sit in the Lords for one Parliament, then resign at the next election and (after a period perhaps as a special adviser) having been gifted a safe seat, enter the Commons ten years later, perhaps becoming a minister soon after that. This Bill, in other words, creates a possible political career path through the Lords, which again suits traditional party politicians – and reduces the independence of the Lords. It would be better simply to provide that once you’ve been in the Lords, you can never be an MP (or a member of a devolved legislature).

Transitional members, now. These are existing members of the Lords who’ll remain to keep the House full until it’s transitioned, by about 2025, to its final composition. The text of the Bill deals extremely shortly with transitional members: the devilish detail is all in Schedule 7. That tells us that (logically enough) the number of transitional members will go down gradually as the number of elected members increases, and disappear altogether by about 2025. From 2015, there’ll probably be roughly 460 of them, since they’re to be two thirds of those currently entitled to attend, the number of whom about 775. From about 2020 there’d be half that number. That makes sense because it means the House would gradually reduce from about 775 to roughly 600, then roughly 500, and finally something around 500 or less when all the transitionals have gone.

But how will the transitionals be chosen? Paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 tells us they’ll be selected according to Standing Orders of the House and that (paragraph 3(2)):

The standing orders may make provision for persons to be selected in any way (for example, by election or by reference to decisions made by political parties or other groups of members).

The italics, obviously, are mine. It’s unacceptable that a major transitional component of the Lords could be the purest party favourites of all.

Appointed members will be chosen (according to clause 13) by an independent Commission – which is fair enough. By the way, you’ll be able to apply because they’re to be selected by fair and open competition. But who appoints the seven Commissioners? Under Schedule 5, it’s the Prime Minister who selects them – admittedly on the basis again of “fair and open competition”. The only restriction on being a Commissioner is that you can’t be a government minister. But that doesn’t exclude ex-ministers, backbench MPs, former MPs or party favourites of any other kind. Once appointed, Commissioners will serve for ten years.

Finally, ministerial members. Clause 24 gives the Prime Minister to choose people to go into the Lords

for the purpose of facilitating the performance by the recommended person of that person’s functions as a Minister of the Crown.

Why this is really needed is unclear, since there are likely to be at least 100 elected members from the governing party or parties. But presumably this is thought essential if the Prime Minister wants to appoint a “goat” like Lord Lester. Once appointed, under clause 24(5), the person remains in the Lords for two electoral periods – about ten to fifteen years. What’s especially interesting is what the Bill tells us, or doesn’t, about the number of these ministerial ministers. It says (clause 24(4)):

An appointment may be made only at a time when there are fewer than 8 ministerial members who are Ministers of the Crown.

At first blush, it seems that this sets a maximum limit of 8 ministerial members at a time. But it’s not so. Remember that, once appointed, these people stay in the House for ten years or so. They don’t stop being ministerial members when they stop being ministers. Yet when they do, the number of ministerial members who are ministers, as clause 24 puts it, goes down by one.

The result is, surely, that the Prime Minister can make 8 people ministers, securing for each of them a place in the Lords for up to fifteen years; a year or two later he can sack them as ministers, replacing them with a new crop of ministerial members; and slowly but surely he can increase the number of these personal appointees to well over the apparently low number of 8. If you imagine a clearout of Lords ministers every couple of years, under these arrangements Tony Blair and Gordon Brown could have created over 50 of these ministerial members between 1997 and 2009 – and most of them would still be in the Lords now.

This power of patronage could be very useful to a Prime Minister, and more than anything else in this Bill it makes a mockery of the democratic claims the government makes for it.

What there’s no provision for, of course, is a referendum. While it’s true that Lords reform along roughly these lines was promised in both the Conservative and LibDem manifestos, it’s such a fundamental constitutional change that voters ought to be asked endorse it. It’s certainly unacceptable for politicians in power to whip through such a defective, in one respect shocking and in others potentially self-serving reform. We should have the right to say no.

US Supreme Court upholds the Affordable Care Act

The big news from America today of course is that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of President Obama’s main legislative achievement, the “Affordable Care Act” or as some critics call it “Obamacare”. At its heart is what’s called the “individual mandate”: a legal requirement for individuals to buy health insurance, or pay a penalty. The full opinion is here, and can be read below.

I’ll leave the analysis to American experts. Today wasn’t a good day for all the American media, but it was very good for the team at SCOTUSblog, who broke the news of the opinion very quickly – and correctly. So I’m going to rely exclusively on their comprehensive coverage.

Here’s Lyle Denniston’s “reader’s guide” to the ruling, and his piece on the tax element of the opinion; a post from Richard A. Epstein on taxation and regulation under the Act; Kevin Russell on the implications for the Medicaid expansion policy; Tejinder Singh on the anti-injunction aspect of the case; and Adam Winkler on the significance of what Chief Justice Roberts said. Finally, here’s Amy Howe’s explanation of the opinion in plain English. I’ve taken from her post this very short summary of the opinion:

Although the Chief Justice rejected the government’s Commerce Clause argument, he agreed with one of the government’s alternative arguments:  the mandate imposes a tax on people who do not buy health insurance, and that tax is something that Congress can impose using its constitutional taxing power …

Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) agreed with the Chief Justice’s bottom line – that the mandate is constitutional under Congress’s ability to tax – even while disagreeing with his Commerce Clause conclusion; those four Justices would have held that Congress could use its power to regulate commerce to pass the mandate.

2012-06-28T18:03:44+00:00Tags: , , |

Lord Kerr on the Assange case

Two weeks ago now at Inner Temple, the Supreme Court Justice Lord Kerr gave the fifth annual Boydell Lecture – and chose as his title A European Understanding of “Judicial Authority” as highlighted in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority. The text’s now been published, and it gives an interesting insight into the case – on which Lord Kerr had given judgment only a fortnight before.

Interestingly this published text doesn’t include Lord Kerr’s remarks about

the limitless capacity of extradition law to induce ennui

extradition being, he said,

a notorious black hole for government lawyers

On the serious legal points, though, what’s interesting is the extent to which Lord Kerr approached the European Arrest Warrant system as a harmonizing EU measure:

the Framework Decision was no mere tinkering with the scheme of extradition … what underpins the new scheme is the notion that the legal systems of the various member states have been subsumed into a supranational order.

I was interested that he said

As a matter of principle, equal weight must be given to the English and French versions

of the Framework Directive, but that did make me wonder whether the Justices had considered any of the other language versions. An EU instrument is after all equally authentic in all the EU languages, so neither English nor French has any special status. It seems to me that the Supreme Court might have found it easier to dismiss Assange’s appeal had they considered the meaning of the German term for “judicial authority” – Justizbehörde – which seems to me much less obviously to imply a judge than the English does.

Lord Kerr sums up his view on the main point as follows:

the plain fact is, as the framers of the Framework Decision well knew, public prosecutors had regularly performed this function in many of the member states. Some agency would have to perform the function in the future. Public prosecutors had been expressly mentioned in the September 2001 draft. It seems to me that, against that background, it is impossible to conclude that it had been agreed that they be excluded from the role.

Here’s the full published text of his speech:

2012-06-28T16:11:04+00:00Tags: , , |
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