A debate has been raging on Twitter and elsewhere about the new coalition’s proposal to legislate to require a 55% Commons majority to dissolve Parliament. Quite a few people are arguing that I and others have got this wrong, and that the proposal is not so awful as it’s been painted.
The central misunderstanding, it’s said, is that a vote for dissolution is not the same as a vote of no confidence; it would still be possible for 51% of Parliament to vote a government down, and force it to resign, according to this argument. Mark Pack has argued that understanding this distinction is the key to “getting” the proposal, and so has Keith Death. So a Commons majority’s inability to force an election if, say, the coalition broke down would not mean a minority Tory government could remain in office. Many, like loveandgarbage, argue that an enhanced threshold like this applies under the Scotland Act, and is no big deal; the coalition simply wants the same sort of rule.
James Medhurst has also put me right, by reminding me that Labour’s manifesto included a promise of fixed-term Parliaments. Quite right, James, I should have remembered that, but didn’t.
Good points, all. But I’m not satisfied – not by a long chalk.
First, let’s look at the Scotland Act. It’s quite true that section 3(1)(a) only permits an “extraordinary general election” (i.e. one before the Parliament runs its full term) if two-thirds of the Parliament votes for one. But you have to bear in mind section 3(1)(b), too, which requires an election if the Parliament is unable to decide who should be First Minister. Section 46 deals with the nomination of a First Minister, and makes it clear the Parliament has 28 days in which to decide on one. Finally, Rule 11.10 of the Standing Orders of the Scottish Parliament sets out the procedure for nominating a First Minister. Those rules are complex, but if you consider paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 9 and 13 you realise that any candidate ultimately needs a simple majority in his or her favour in order to be nominated. It’s possible for MSPs to abstain, and allow a minority preference to be nominated; but it’s also possible for a determined minority of 51% to block any nomination, and thus force an election under section 3(1)(b) of the Act. The Scottish system therefore contains a “safety valve” requiring dissolution if a Parliamentary majority wants one. It isn’t true to say it always requires an enhanced majority for dissolution as a hard and fast rule.
If the coalition wants a similar system to that, it would make their 55% proposal more palatable. But do they? It seems to me that to do so would actually defeat the purpose of the 55% rule.
Think about it this way. If the LibDems left the coalition, then they, Labour and others could get together and vote the government out of office. David Cameron would have to resign, according to Mark Pack and Keith Death. But who would govern in his place? If you have a hard and fast 55% threshold for dissolution, then the majority would have to form some sort of arrangement to govern together, the progressive coalition would be mandatory, and (because it would only have 53% of the seats) could not seek a mandate without Conservative agreement, even if it wanted to. But what if the progressive coalition couldn’t agree? Would Harriet Harman, as leader of the second party, have to form a government? If you think about it she would have to be tolerated by the failed progressive coalition, or else she’d be defeated on a confidence vote, too, and would have to resign. On this logic, politicians who could not agree on a programme would be forced to tolerate an unwanted minority government, or else leave the country without any sort of government at all. The country would be at the mercy of the Conservative party, and we’d have to hope its MPs acted sensibly
And of course these decisions – Labour’s and the LibDems’ decision whether or not to work together, Plaid’s, the SDLP’s and others decisions whether to join in and so on – would have to be taken within the short period between David Cameron’s resignation following the no confidence motion and the summoning of a new PM. How long would be allowed? Would the country be without a government for days? Or would (as my original post feared) a minority Conservative government be allowed to stay in office anyway, pending an alternative?
When you take all this in, you realise that the distinction between a no confidence vote and a vote for dissolution is a vanishing one. If the LibDems left the coalition, they would first need to decide whether or not they could strike a deal with Labour and others. If so, they could vote down the remaining Conservative administration, and the Queen could send for Harriet Harman. But if not, there would be no point whatever in a no confidence motion. The 55% rule would operate just as intended – as a deterrent to such a motion. It would indeed protect a minority Conservative government even if it did not have the confidence of the House.
It’s quite true that 51% of MPs could vote to repeal the 55% rule, so rendering it ineffective in the first place. But first, that depends on the current administration allowing Parliament to debate and vote on a Bill introduced by opposition MPs. Could we be sure it would do so? Second, that assumes the coalition is not intending to “entrench” its 55% rule, by for instance requiring a 55% majority to repeal it. That would be really dangerous constitutional fiddling – but then the 55% rule is dangerous constitutional fiddling anyway. I wouldn’t put it past them.
What are the alternatives? Well, you could have the Scottish safety valve I described above, which would allow a 51% majority to force a dissolution, after all – you would simply have a 28 day waiting period, and no truly fixed-term Parliament at all.
A much better way of achieving what I think the coalition wants is a public agreement that a 51% majority in Parliament must agree before the PM could seek a dissolution from the Queen – arguably creating a new constitutional convention about dissolution. Or, if that’s not firm enough for them, they could pass legislation requiring a 51% majority resolution before the PM could ask for a dissolution. That would prevent David Cameron from seeking a dissolution without LibDem agreement. But it would not protect him from Parliamentary accountability.
The 55% proposal remains a bad, undemocratic one, and should be opposed. None of the arguments anyone has made have persuaded me otherwise.
“If you have a hard and fast 55% threshold for dissolution, then the majority would have to form some sort of arrangement to govern together, The progressive coalition would be mandatory, and (because it would only have 43% of the seats) could not seek a mandate without Conservative agreement”
This is false, If the Libs left the coalition Tories have 47% of the vote, and a rainbow coalition would have over 50% of the vote (just), they could seek the right to govern and the queen would accept a new government. Tories don’t have to support anything.
People are still missing the point, the 55% is supposed to stop GOVERNMENTS from forcing elections, not the minorities in opposition. It is to cement the fixed term nature of parliament and not allow the people in power to call an election when it is politically expedient for them to do so. In that sense it is too low as Lib Dems and Tories could still disolve parliament on a 55% threshold.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
It ain’t false, Lee. With respect I think it’s you who’s missing the point. I didn’t say a new progressive coalition would require Conservative support. What I said is that any new progressive coalition could not seek a mandate without Conservative support. That is a necessary consequence of the 55% rule, if it’s a hard and fast rule.
I can understand the wish to prevent a government from forcing an election, especially if it’s a minority government. I’ve suggested two alternatives which would achieve just that result in this Parliament, without the controversy of 55%. Why aren’t they good enough for you?
OK, ignore what I said above to a degree (I admit it, I misread something too!), but you’re now starting to extrapolate how the system will work from one line of an announcement? I am assuming the system will work as in Scotland, but we don’t know this.
Shouldn’t you be more cautious and wait to see what the actual policy will be before you start saying it needs to be opposed?
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
“I said is that any new progressive coalition could not seek a mandate without Conservative support”
It could try to form a minority coalition, it’s more complicated than you make out, and also more likely than you make out.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
” I’ve suggested two alternatives which would achieve just that result in this Parliament, without the controversy of 55%. Why aren’t they good enough for you?”
Because your first option basically means a majority government can call an election whenever they like, and again the second is allowing a majority government to call an election whenever they like, neither of which is keeping the integrity of the system.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
There are some things worth worrying about and I really feel this issue does not fall into that category.
If 326 MPs really want rid of a government they can still achieve this by blocking everything, including Business of the House. I’m sure the ensuing rumpus would persuade 10 or more Conservative MPs to concede an election is therefore the least worst solution.
If such a change can be made on an ordinary vote, what’s to stop the opposition hijacking parliamentary business and introducing counter-legislation (or instrument).
Personally I see this change as part of the concessions on both sides to make it harder but not impossible for either coalition partner to hold the other to ransom by threatening a snap election.
The Conservatives have made an important concession by pre-announcing the full 5-year term, and the Lib Dems have conceded the ability to team up with the other parties and force an election through no confidence.
And yes Jim, I know this is a rather simplistic argument!
“Personally I see this change as part of the concessions on both sides to make it harder but not impossible for either coalition partner to hold the other to ransom by threatening a snap election.”
This is certainly the short term aim, I’m sure, that’s how the maths look. Especially as 55% is so low it allows a Lib/Con coalition to still force an election despite fixed terms.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
I don’t think it is more complex, Lee. Yes, others could try to form a minority coalition. There are several possibilities. But one and only one option would be excluded, without Conservative support, and it’s the most democratic one, i.e. an election.
And no, I don’t think I should wait. I don’t see the reason for being so deferential about it. If the coalition wanted the Scottish system, I still wouldn’t be happy with that, because I don’t see why a majority shouldn’t be able to force an immediate dissolution if it wants one. And anyway, I see no evidence from anything the coalition has said that it even wants the Scottish system. If it does, it could say so today. If it hasn’t thought through the detail, then it should have done so before agreeing to such a thing – and it needs to be forced to think it through now.
Or better still back down.
how does the 55% stop a government from seeking an election? In practice?
– if the govt have 55% (which is usual) then obviously it does what it likes
– if the govt has <55% and puts a vote to parliament for an election, do we really think that the opposition are going to vote to keep parliament going, and therefore the govt in power? I don't think so.
.-= botogol´s last blog ..Ups and Downs =-.
Under the Scotland Act, you need 51% at least twice (i.e. once to vote to remove the sitting First Minister and then each time to block a nominated replacement). I’m not familiar with the procedural rules of the Scottish Parliament but I would guess that it would be easier to get time to vote down the sitting first minister in the Scottish parliament than to repeal the “55% Act” in Westminster?
“There are several possibilities. But one and only one option would be excluded, without Conservative support, and it’s the most democratic one, i.e. an election.”
You can’t say that because you don’t know what the policy will be. It’s all well and good saying they haven’t thought through the detail but you don’t know that either. All we have is one announcement in a summary document of agreements that you’re extrapolating a whole lot of “what if” over-reactions from.
“I don’t see why a majority shouldn’t be able to force an immediate dissolution if it wants one.”
That’s a fine view, you’re probably against Fixed Term Parliaments in that case; but if you end up with a fixed term parliament (or support) the majority shouldn’t be able to force dissolution because otherwise there is no point in the parliaments being fixed term at all.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
I am against fixed-term Parliaments, Lee, yes. That’s what all this is about, in a sense; I’m glad the 55% thing is making some people realise fixed-term Parliaments are not the slam-dunk obvious democratic improvement their supporters claim. There’s a serious democratic case against them.
As for “what ifs”: thinking something through, especially in constitutional law, consists precisely of testing it against lots of “what ifs”. If there is more detail that would reassure me, then pressurise Nick Clegg (I guess he’s in charge of this) to explain that detail, now.
With respect, your analysis somehow takes the facts as we have them, ignores them, and comes to a conclusion that’s been disproved. As has been pointed out, this stops Cameron dissolving parliament and calling an election, unless he gets support from other people.
As the coalition details we’ve seen repeatedly mentions motions of no confidence in relation to things the Lib Dems can abstain/vote against on without causing the government to fall, extending the part about 55% needed for dissolution this far makes little sense.
Fixed parliaments are more democratic, they take the power of dissolution of parliament away from the Queen and PM pairing, and in to the hands of the House of Commons. How anyone can portray that as less democratic is quite frankly barmy.
“If there is more detail that would reassure me, then pressurise Nick Clegg (I guess he’s in charge of this) to explain that detail, now.”
Why? It’s not even going to the house of commons yet. Welcome to democracy, they publish a bill, we all get to see it, we lobby our MPs to either amend it or vote it down…bada boom, democracy in action…unlike this baying mob of over-reaction.
.-= Lee Griffin´s last blog ..Niaccurshi: @Scarletstand No it doesn’t, it keeps parliament running as long as it can. Tories would still lose power under a no confidence =-.
Lee, it may not be going to the House of Commons yet, but is it not part of the formal agreement between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats? Will it be considered by the Liberal Democrats Convention on Saturday which, as I understand it, has the final say in approving the coalition? You apparently feel that it is in order for these crucial decisions to be made in the absence of these important details. You castigate Carl: “All we have is one announcement in a summary document of agreements that you’re extrapolating a whole lot of “what if” over-reactions from.” But you feel that it’s legitimate for the negotiating parties to make a profound alteration to our constitutional procedures on the same basis.
In a parliamentary democracy, a coalition agreement is no more binding than a manifesto. It is a statement of intent but if there is advice from the Attorney General that the proposal is unworkable then it will be scrapped.
I agree that there is some doubt as to the position if a government were to be opposed by between 50% and 55% of Parliament. I am certain that the political reality is that the Prime Minister would resign while Parliament continued but it is a bit murky as to whether a resignation could be forced. This problem is very far from insoluble and does not affect the principle.
Placing a restriction only on the power of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament is not good enough. The primary goal of fixed-term parliaments is not to prevent dissolution in favourable circumstances but to encourage long-term thinking, especially in economic policy, a particularly pressing issue at the moment. Rewarding governments for periods of unprecedented growth is like paying bonuses to bankers. If the detractors are correct and cracks start to appear in the coalition, we do not want the Treasury to have the threat of a possible election in mind when it is making difficult decisions.
There is only one of the aims of the Chartists that has not been adopted and that is their demand for annual general elections. There is a reason for this.
.-= James Medhurst´s last blog ..Reformulating claims =-.
Ron says “But you feel that it’s legitimate for the negotiating parties to make a profound alteration to our constitutional procedures on the same basis.”
I don’t think that’s what Lee’s saying at all. What’s being said is that the fine print of the proposal has not yet been published, and a fair number of people seem to be assuming the worst – first it was touted as an alteration of the no-confidence rule (it isn’t), then there’s this bizarre claim by Carl that a “progressive coalition … could not seek a mandate without Conservative agreement, even if it wanted to” (actually it could; any coalition could be formed if it could command the confidence of sitting MPs, which merely requires a simple majority, or even a minority if enough MPs abstain).
It would also seem, given Carl’s later submission to Radio 4’s PM programme in which he dismisses criticism of his position as “spin”, that he has set his face against this proposal, no matter what the fine details might be. That is unfortunate.
Pointing out that people are leaping to conclusions based on a whole raft of assumptions is not “spin”, nor is it a case of demanding “deference”. When the Bill is eventually published, we will all be able to examine its provisions and assess its merits. That is the sensible thing to do. Leaping to completely unwarranted conclusions based on a paucity of information is not, and accusing others of “spin” when they point out that simple truth is not a particularly helpful contribution to the discussion. If the Bill turns out to be a pig’s breakfast, I’ll happily join Carl in opposing it. I am not going to prejudge it before I’ve seen it.
Carl then says “When you take all this in, you realise that the distinction between a no confidence vote and a vote for dissolution is a vanishing one.”
That is, if and only if Carl’s worst fears were to come true (that a Bill on fixed-term Parliaments would contain no provisions whatsoever for escaping from a legislative deadlock), and if one accepts Carl’s erroneous notion that the Conservatives were in a position to prevent any other coalition from being formed, then we end up with either a coalition or a Conservative minority Government until 2015, come what may.
I think it’s fair to point out that there needs to be provisions for resolving legislative deadlock.
But I do not accept that such provisions would amount to having no fixed-term Parliaments at all (only Norway and Switzerland have “absolute” fixed-term Parliaments, as far as I am aware); and I do not consider it at all obvious that one should leap to the conclusion that a Bill would not contain any such provisions, purely on the basis that the coalition agreement document does not go into fine detail. The coalition agreement document does not go into the fine details of any measure; that is not its purpose. That is what a Bill is for, and a Bill will be brought before the House in due course.
Further, we have the precedent of the Scotland Act 1998, which may well serve as a template for any measure applied to Westminster. It is not as if these issues have not been considered and resolved before. They have. Why Carl would assume that a future Bill involving fixed terms for Westminster would totally ignore what has gone before, frankly baffles me.
If one is against fixed-term Parliaments, that’s fine. But let’s not pretend that a proposal that would allow Parliament to dissolve itself with a supermajority of 55% is any less democratic than the current situation, where a single MP (the Prime Minister) is able to dissolve Parliament at whim. Whether it’s 50%+1, 55% or 66⅔%, the principle is that it is our representatives on the floor of the House, and *not* the Prime Minister, who will determine when Parliament is dissolved, and it is they who will have to go back and justify their vote to their electors.
It does rather seem as if the no-to-55% lobby, having been caught out by a glaring error the BBC made yesterday (which is understandable – who wouldn’t trust the BBC to report facts accurately after all?), is now back-pedalling, desperately looking for something in this proposal with which to disagree.
.-= Keith´s last blog ..The 55% rule: a storm in a teacup? =-.
Total non-lawyer here.
When I first heard about this I was very worried and more than a little annoyed. But… Know what guys? I’ve thought about it, kicked it about and now I’m relaxed about it.
Leaving legal niceties and parliamentary convention aside what would the electorate think of a government that refused to go having lost a confidence vote by 50%+1? What would they (we) make of a party or coalition grouping that, having lost power in a confidence vote, refused to allow an election because of its commitment to the principle of fixed term parliaments?
I doubt that voters will ever see parliamentary terms as some universal constant on a par with the speed of light.
We might be talking about a new politics but it’s the same old country underneath and voters will know an affront to democracy when they see one.
[…] can find more about it here, here and by following the links embedded in their posts. What you will find is that just about […]
Keith, the Bill will be being published after the establishment of the coalition which was contingent on the agreement of the parties. You seem to be agreeing that important details are not, and will not be available until that publication. The agreement was therefore undertaken in the absence of information which you seem to recognise as being critically important. “It will be alright on the night” doesn’t seem to be the strongest argument for a change of this sort. The assumption that any Bill on any issue would not fail to take into consideration what has gone before seems to me to be both over-optimistic and somewhat unwordly.
Hi Carl
How do you feel this situation would be any different from present, i.e. it being the royal prerogative, reserved to the PM? Surely that option would be technically excluded now?
Even if the 55% couldn’t be removed by a simple majority I think it would be political suicide for any Party to sit in the House of Commons actively blocking an election that was being called for by a majority of MPs.
I see one fundamental difference between a vote of no confidence (>50%) and a vote to dissolve Parliament (>55%). The former comes when Parliament has lost faith in the government – the latter could come if the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives decided to call an election, but not if only one of them did.
In that respect, it is not really a measure to introduce added democracy but to make concrete what would otherwise be a mere promise from the Conservatives to the Lib Dems.
Whether it is acceptable to fiddle with the constitution to make stable the coalition is perhaps another question, which I am not settled on as yet.
Nigel
.-= Nigel Brook´s last blog ..Cooperation Politics =-.
Ron, all I’m saying is that the coalition agreement document says what it says, and does not say what it does not say.
The coalition agreement document is not a Bill. It is not intended to be. It is intended to outline the areas of consensus whereby the coalition partners can set out a legislative programme. It is, in effect, a new manifesto – and it is in the nature of manifestos that they do not go into excruciating detail; when the details are fleshed out, the proposal becomes more concrete, and we subsequently get a Bill that is subject to critical scrutiny by both houses of Parliament and the public – then we’ll know precisely what we’re dealing with.
So it’s not a case of “It’ll be alright on the night”. It’s a case of “We don’t even have a script yet”. I don’t think it’s “optimistic” to say that I wish to see the actual text of the Bill so that I can come to an informed judgement. And I would put it to you, conversely, that the assumption that Parliament would pass a Bill providing for fixed-term Parliaments, having taken no account whatsoever of existing practices in Parliaments and assemblies either within the UK or elsewhere, would be cynicism of the highest order.
.-= Keith´s last blog ..The 55% rule: a storm in a teacup? =-.
When you said,
‘A much better way of achieving what I think the coalition wants is a public agreement that a 51% majority in Parliament must agree before the PM could seek a dissolution from the Queen – arguably creating a new constitutional convention about dissolution.’
– did you mean 51%? Why a percentage? This is still as bad and as arbitrary as 55% – 51% is half of Parliament plus 6 and a half votes! I want the current system – a majority means half the house plus one.
“If the coalition wants a similar system to that, it would make their 55% proposal more palatable. But do they?”
Extremely likely to be including, because to leave out such a clause would be to leave an obvious risk of a consitutional crisis.
“It seems to me that to do so would actually defeat the purpose of the 55% rule.”
It is certainly possible that Tories were wrongly reassured by the idea that this gave them an advantage – they haven’t spent as long pondering electoral reform as the Lib Dems. My reading is that the Lib Dems put one over on them, and now all these silly people whinging about the 55% rule are forcing that minor deception out into the open.
All you need to do to make this legislation watertight is add in a 28 day cut off – since the immediate precedent of the Scots parliament, which Labour passed, has this clause it seems fatuous to leap to the conclusion it won’t be in the Westminster version, simply because a very brief reference in the coalition document didn’t spell this out.