I don’t propose to comment at any length on this Lords judgment from the week before last. It has interesting facts, and signals that the BBC are planning to screen an interesting programme about possible “wrong acquittals”, which in my view are miscarriages of justice just as serious as wrongful convictions. But the human rights principles applied in it are unremarkable.
The case makes me think about DNA databases again, though. I support the national DNA database, and though I wouldn’t go as far as Sedley LJ, I do think a wide database is a good idea and regret the decision of the ECtHR in S and Marper, which I think far too interventionist. Reading this Lords judgment should bring home to critics of the DNA database what the practical consequences of their stance are: a case like “D”‘s will in future lead to no charge for rape.
I must say, I personally find it difficult to see how anyone can square concern about rape conviction figures with opposition to the use of DNA evidence in this type of case. I know most rapes are not committed by strangers, so that identity is in issue in a minority of cases. But that point is a diversion. The important point is that DNA evidence would help obtain reliable convictions for rape in a number of cases – if we allow ourselves to use it. How can we or Strasbourg allow purely theoretical civil liberties worries to rule it out?
Isn’t the rape conviction rate a serious human rights issue?
I've blogged before about how the human rights agenda will eventually kill off all of our civil liberties. This looks like good evidence to support my thesis.
How can we or Strasbourg allow purely theoretical civil liberties worries to rule it out?
Umm..are you saying that a theoretical problem (which by its nature is fundamental and unable to be modified) can just be ignored if you fancy changing things a bit?